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Abstract 
 
Political leaders are ultimately responsible for their country’s foreign policy, but our 
understanding of how executive turnover affects the likelihood of international treaty ratification 
remains limited. For contributing to this debate, I define leader change as the replacement of the 
executive leader by a new one who relies on different social groups for support. Focusing then on 
those cases where new leaders can assume office only from predecessors who plausibly 
supported treaty ratification, I expect that – in light of the predecessor’s support for an agreement 
and the change in the domestic support base – leadership turnover makes ratification less likely. 
The empirical implication is tested with quantitative methods using data on multilateral treaties 
of the post-Cold War era. The main findings and a series of additional analyses provide strong 
and robust evidence for the theoretical argument. This research sheds new light on the 
determinants of multilateral cooperation as well as the role of government leaders in international 
affairs and foreign-policy decision-making. 
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Many contemporary political issues are of a transnational nature and cannot be addressed by 
states solely at the domestic level or unilaterally. Transboundary air pollution, interstate trade, or 
international security concerns are just a few of those matters that require several nations’ 
coordinated efforts at the international level in order to be regulated effectively. Arguably, the 
most prominent – and perhaps even necessary – instruments for doing so are international 
agreements, which are commonly defined as formal treaties between two or more countries that 
outline rules, regulations, and changes in state behavior for dealing with an international issue. 
Governments can commit to these treaties, join them, and participate in them usually by 
ratification or accession (see, e.g., Martin 1993; Schneider and Urpelainen 2013; Wangler et al. 
2013; Lupu 2016). 
This article seeks to shed light, theoretically and empirically, on how a change in the executive 
political leadership of a country shapes in turn the chances of ratifying an international treaty. To 
this end, I focus on what is arguably one of the most important influences in foreign-policy 
decision making: leaders are often the crucial actors in negotiating international agreements, they 
are the political actors that either ratify treaties themselves or submit an agreement to domestic-
level legislative bodies for confirmation after their signature, and they are ultimately responsible 
for their states’ foreign policies.1 There is plenty of anecdotal evidence pointing toward the 
relevance of executive leader turnover in the context of ratification. Consider, for example, the 
US non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol after George W. Bush replaced Bill Clinton as 
president of the United States (who, in fact, signed this agreement in 1997).2 Likewise, Donald J. 
Trump quickly withdrew US support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) after assuming 
                                                        
1
 For a general overview of the importance of leaders, see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Chiozza and 
Goemans (2004), McGillivray and Smith (2004, 2008), Goemans et al. (2009), Stanley (2009), Stanley and Sawyer 
(2009), Debs and Goemans (2010), Croco (2011), Bang et al. (2012), or Wolford (2012). 
2
  Leaders are not the only actors in a political system affecting the process of treaty ratification. Many countries 
require parliamentary (legislative) approval for the ratification of an international agreement, making legislative 
bodies effectively a veto player (e.g., Mansfield et al. 2007, 2008; Lupu 2015). While I focus on the role of leaders 
in the following, I return to the influence of legislative bodies in the research design. 
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office, while the Obama administration was strongly in favor of implementing this agreement. 
The non-ratification of multilateral cooperative efforts, particularly by key actors such as the US, 
usually has “major ramifications” (Bang et al. 2012: 756): it can significantly lower the 
effectiveness of international treaties or hamper future negotiations to come.  
The following study contributes to this debate by systematically analyzing the relationship 
between leadership turnover and international treaty ratification. Wolford (2012: 519) states that 
“most state-centric research assumes that international agreements are robust to changes in 
leadership.” While he refers to continued respect for a previously ratified international obligation, 
policymakers, public institutions, and scholars do not know whether Wolford’s assessment 
applies (or not) in another context, i.e., continued support for an un-ratified but signed treaty, as 
well. In one of the first steps toward furthering our knowledge on how leader change affects a 
country’s likelihood to ratify an international agreement, I focus on the replacement of the 
executive leader by a new one who relies on different social groups for support. This treatment is 
theoretically important and based on recently compiled data on leadership changes that involve 
the replacement of a leader’s support base, i.e., source of leader support (SOLS) changes (Mattes 
et al. 2015, 2016).  
The theory thus concentrates on the change in the ideological support base associated with a 
leadership turnover, and it does so in light of predecessors who were arguably supportive of 
ratifying an agreement. The latter is captured by the predecessor’s signature of an agreement: 
signature largely is a “symbolic” act (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013: 14), and the consent of a 
state to be bound by a treaty is normally expressed by ratification as agreements usually 
emphasize that signatures are subject to that legal act (Art. 14 in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties). However, signature does constitute a strong signal of a country’s general 
willingness to fully join and be bound by an agreement in the future (see Baccini and Urpelainen 
4 
 
2014; Hugh-Jones et al. 2016). I ultimately contend that leadership turnover should make 
ratification less likely given (1) the predecessor’s support for an agreement and (2) the change in 
the domestic support base. Empirically, I employ logistic regression models on data of 
multilateral treaties that have been concluded in the post-Cold War era (Elsig et al. 2011; 
Milewicz and Elsig 2014), which I combine with own, recently compiled data on state signatures. 
The core results and several additional analyses that comprise a different estimator, different 
samples, or different approaches to calculate the standard errors robustly show that leadership 
turnover decreases the chances of treaty ratification.  
The article crucially informs our understanding of the determinants behind countries’ 
participation in international treaties as well as of the role of government leaders in foreign-
policy decision-making. My core finding is that leader turnovers significantly and substantially 
influence the likelihood of states participating in multilateral agreements. This result contributes 
to the vast literature on the determinants behind treaty ratification that, thus far, focused more on 
institutional or structural factors as explanations. With respect to the literature on leadership 
turnover, I make one central contribution. While there is anecdotal evidence that executive 
leadership change shapes the likelihood of agreement ratification, my study is the first to provide 
systematic evidence. While many scholars have sought to understand how leader turnover affects 
foreign policy more generally, including the continuation of support of an existing multilateral 
cooperation framework, few explore how the initial ratification decision is influenced. 
Particularly in light of this point, and assuming that those factors leading to a state’s initial 
ratification decision also influence compliance with and the implementation of an agreement 
afterwards, the implications of my study go well beyond ratification as such. I conclude by 
discussing this research’s significance for future scholarly work and policymakers.  
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The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Treaty Ratification: Theory 
Leaders are the focal point of interest in several fields of international relations or comparative 
politics (Goemans et al. 2009: 270f). For example, the impact of leaders and leader turnover 
features prominently in, among other fields, the study of international conflict (e.g., Chiozza and 
Choi 2003; Schultz 2005; Croco 2011; Quiroz Flores 2012; Wolford 2007, 2012), military 
coalitions and alliances (e.g., Leeds 2003; Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer 2009; Pilster et al. 
2015; Wolford and Hencken Ritter 2016), voting behavior in the United Nations and foreign 
policy decision-making in general (e.g., Levy 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Mattes et al. 
2015; Smith 2016), or trade relationships (e.g., McGillivray and Smith 2004, 2008; Hollyer and 
Rosendorff 2012; Bobick and Smith 2013). I concentrate on the impact of executive leadership 
change and, in more detail, only those leader turnovers that are accompanied by a change in the 
domestic social support base (Mattes et al. 2015, 2016). This treatment ensures that a change in 
the executive leadership always goes with a change in political ideology (at least to some extent). 
In addition, the theory also requires that all cases (those with and without a leadership turnover as 
defined above) are tied to a preceding government (before a potential leadership change may 
have occurred) having signaled that it would support ratification of an international treaty.3 
Following Baccini and Urpelainen (2014) or Hugh-Jones et al. (2016), I use a government’s 
signature of a treaty as a strong signal for that it intends to be bound by that agreement subject to 
ratification that then commits the government “more strongly” in a legally-binding way.  
I argue that a new political leader will be significantly less likely to ratify an international 
agreement in light of the predecessor’s support for an agreement and the change in the domestic 
support base. The underlying mechanism for this argument focuses on entrapment and leaders’ 
                                                        
3
  Note here that this ensures that leader turnover can only occur after a treaty has been opened for ratification, and 
after a predecessor government (if any) signalled its willingness to ratify a treaty. In other words, the incoming 
leader has not been involved in negotiating or drafting an agreement. 
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preferences and beliefs. I develop this mechanism in four steps and it is based on the assumption 
that leaders are office seeking. Therefore, I assume that they at least try not to displease their 
domestic audiences with foreign policy decisions and, hence, also when considering the 
ratification of international treaties (see Downs 1957: 28; Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988: 434; 
Vertzberger 1998: 214; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).4 This assumption applies to non-
democratic states as well (see, e.g., Goemans 2000; Croco 2011). However, a reasonable 
objection to this may be in my context that the content of agreements and the issues they address 
may not be that salient to the domestic audience, and it may well be suggested that the majority 
of the electorate is indifferent to these policies. There are three arguments against this.  
First, international treaties are, in fact, frequently more salient to domestic audiences than 
conventional wisdom may suggest. The domestic-level debates in several European countries in 
the context of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) or Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) illustrate this. Regarding TTIP, for instance, 97 percent 
of about 150,000 respondents in a European Commission survey on TTIP had largely negative 
views.5 Numerous protests in Europe against TTIP further underline that the (at least the 
European) public actually had (and still has) very strong views on this multilateral trade 
agreement. Second, Cazals and Sauquet (2015: 266) examine international environmental treaties 
and claim that “leaders act strategically even when it relates to secondary policy issues.” Hence, 
leaders are likely to take into account their domestic constituents for the ratification decisions 
considered here, too; and even the dissatisfaction of a small domestic group may have an impact. 
Third, derived from the previous two arguments, following Mattes et al. (2015: 283), states’ 
                                                        
4
  As Putnam (1988: 434) emphasizes, “any leader who fails [in international negotiations] to satisfy his fellow 
players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.” And in the words of Wangler et al. (2013: 391), “a 
government’s proposal at international negotiations should be acceptable to its domestic constituents because this, 
in the end, will help to win elections.” 
5
  See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-292_en.htm.  
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treaty-ratification behavior represents “an indirect reflection of the foreign policy position of a 
state,” which usually is important to the domestic audience. Put differently, a country’s decision 
to participate or not in an international agreement “is a latent indicator of its foreign policy 
orientation [...]; it is a record of how the state wants to be seen by others, the international norms 
it finds acceptable, and the positions it is willing to take publicly on a wide variety of issues” 
(Mattes et al. 2015: 283). Domestic audiences do care about this, and they take into account the 
costs (and benefits) an international commitment may impose on them. 
In light of this, my argument then focuses on situations in which a new leader replaces one 
who has signaled support for ratifying an agreement by her signature (Baccini and Urpelainen 
2014; Hugh-Jones et al. 2016). As indicated, leader transitions refer to those cases where the new 
leader relies on different social groups for support, i.e., SOLS changes (Mattes et al. 2015, 2016). 
I develop the argument and its underlying mechanism in four steps. First, among other factors, 
domestic interest groups, political factions, and the general domestic public are likely to 
condition their support of a leader on the country’s foreign policy – and the participation or non-
participation in a specific international treaty is a direct reflection of that (Schelling 1960; 
Putnam 1988; McGillivray and Smith 2008; Cazals and Sauquet 2015; Mattes et al. 2015). 
Second, political leaders who are in favor of joining an agreement – potentially because this 
satisfies their domestic audience, political factions, and interest groups – signal their willingness 
to do so via signing it (see also Baccini and Urpelainen 2014; Hugh-Jones et al. 2016).6  
In turn, third, though, leaders are committed to a treaty by their own constituencies at the 
domestic level – they are “entrapped” (see also Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer 2009: 657; 
                                                        
6
 Clearly, not all states that have not signed a treaty do oppose it. Frequently, governments immediately ratify a 
treaty and this makes signature unnecessary. However, the empirical analysis requires a clear and observable signal 
of support for an international agreement before ratification, and only signature can provide this. In light of this 
discussion, the results I obtain are, in fact, conservative estimates as it is likely that I omit a series of cases where 
leaders have not publicly expressed their support for an agreement before a leadership turnover. 
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Croco 2011). Indeed, leaders’ original support for an agreement was presumably based on what 
they believe their domestic constituency wants. In case a leader’s foreign policy would go against 
these groups’ interests, they may sanction her by withdrawing support. Industrial sectors 
interested in certain trade or economic policies, bureaucratic groups implementing international 
security or environmental treaties, or members of the winning coalition are all potential veto 
players in this context (Vertzberger 1998: 105ff). In addition, leaders themselves might believe 
that it is “the right thing” to support joining a treaty. However, beliefs are stable and unlikely to 
change over the course of office of one political leader (Saunders 2009: 131f): if the leader in 
office supports the ratification of an agreement, she will probably not change her beliefs during 
her tenure. 
Fourth, this implies that only a new leader with a different political orientation, stemming 
from a different domestic social support base, is likely to change a state’s foreign policy, 
including the way the ratification of an international agreement is seen. It is then only leader 
turnover that is likely able to move out of “entrapment.” New leaders with a different political 
orientation are likely to have dissimilar beliefs, ideologies, and perceptions regarding foreign 
policy – and the commitment to multilateral efforts at the international level (Walker 1983: 181ff; 
Wolford 2007: 774; Saunders 2009: 129ff). This is because they represent new constituencies 
with interests that may differ from those of the previous leaders and her support base 
(McGillivray and Stam 2004: 160ff; Croco 2011). As Wolford (2012: 517) emphasizes, 
“leadership turnover may produce significant foreign policy changes when leaders differ from 
their predecessors in their preferences. A difference in those beliefs is likely to be only given if 
the prior and the new leader clearly differ in their political orientation.” These varying 
preferences or beliefs result in contrasting evaluations of the benefits a state can derive from 
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ratifying an international agreement. Ultimately, the likelihood of ratification decreases with 
leader turnover if the predecessor supported a treaty and the new one has a different support base. 
I thus conclude that new leaders with new constituencies, which brought them into power and 
that have interests differing from those of the previous leader, are more likely to depart from their 
predecessors’ ratification intention. To be clear, international agreements do entail benefits and 
probably even so for incoming leaders, but their perceptions and rationale might tell them to 
pursue decisions that differ from their predecessors, and they then do not pursue ratification: 
considering ratifying a treaty that the predecessor has deliberately decided to commit to via their 
signature is unlikely to consolidate a new leader’s power (see also Cazals and Sauquet 2015: 
266).7 Eventually, the mechanism I outlined points to the following empirical expectation: 
Leadership Turnover Hypothesis: Political leadership turnover with a change in the 
domestic support base is associated with a lower likelihood of international agreement 
ratification if the predecessor supported an agreement. 
 
Research Design 
Data, Dependent Variable, and Methodology 
Figure 1 graphically depicts the time frame of events underlying my theoretical argument. This 
graph also highlights two important points. First, I analyze a sample that comprises only those 
treaty-country pairs (which constitute my unit of analysis) that actually saw a (preceding) 
government signing that agreement. If I would consider also treaty-country pairs that did not see 
a signature before ratification, I would lack a credible signal on whether a government is willing 
                                                        
7
  A possible objection to this argument may be that leadership tenures in the data I use are too long: eventually, 
power will be secured and more “risky” policies become more likely. Note, however, that the average duration of a 
treaty-country pair in my data is 4.34 years only. I address this concern further in the Supplementary Materials with 
a sample that omits longer treaty-country spells and a duration model capturing the time elapsed until ratification. 
Also note the estimations in Table 3 below. 
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to eventually fully join an agreement.8 Second, the critical points in time in my analysis do not 
overlap, i.e., signature has to precede leadership change (if any), which in turn has to occur 
before ratification (if any).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Time Frame of Focal Events 
 
Against this background, the empirical analysis focuses on SOLS changes (Mattes et al. 2015, 
2016) and a clear signal of support for a treaty by a preceding government for examining how 
leadership turnover is related to the ratification of treaties. As a general data framework, I employ 
one of the most recent data sets on international cooperation efforts by Elsig et al. (2011; see also 
Milewicz and Elsig 2014). These scholars compiled information on multilateral treaties that have 
been concluded in the post-Cold War period and (1) are universal to the extent that all recognized 
states can potentially ratify them,9 (2) address global concerns, and (3) depart from previous 
practice, i.e., agreements do not merely mirror pre-existing commitments, but depart from 
existing state policies. Due to the last coding criterion, it is ensured that states have to change 
their current behavior at least to some extent. Hence, adjustments are necessary and, therefore, 
                                                        
8
 This is solely an empirical point and does not imply that the scope conditions of the theory are limited. The theory 
also applies to treaties that come into force, e.g., simply based on signature. A leadership change before this legal 
act may well influence, in fact, whether a state will eventually join that agreement via signing it. That said, relying 
on the sequence of signature and then (potentially) ratification ensures that I can observe a credible signal on 
whether a state intends to eventually support and join a treaty. 
9
 Ratification is required for all treaties in this data set to come into force – signature alone is insufficient. 
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ratification of any treaty regardless of the issue area in the data set is associated at least initially 
with costs (see also Cazals and Sauquet 2015: 267). Also, these agreements can then potentially 
affect the status quo and produce relevant outcomes in their diverse policy areas substantially – 
which is what the domestic audience will have anticipated and noticed, and may have taken into 
account in their support for the leader (see also Mattes et al. 2015). In fact, most of the 
agreements in the sample address highly salient issue areas, e.g., the Kyoto Protocol (for 
environment), several World Trade Organization treaties (trade), the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (security and crime), or the Hague Convention of International Protection of Adults 
(human rights). 
The data by Elsig et al. (2011; see also Milewicz and Elsig 2014) only provide information on 
the agreement’s name and the year of ratification. As I also require information on whether a 
(predecessor) government potentially supported the ratification of a treaty, I compiled the data on 
state signatories (if any) and the year of their signature myself. Primarily, I relied on the United 
Nations Treaty Collection database10 for this, but also used primary sources such as agreement 
websites. I then combined the information on signature with the ratification data by Elsig et al. 
(2011; see also Milewicz and Elsig 2014) in order to create a sample of treaty-country pairs in the 
post-Cold War period that have seen signature before a leadership change or ratification (if any). 
That is, treaty-country combinations where the agreement has not been signed and those where 
signature and leadership change overlap, are omitted from the analysis. The data by Elsig et al. 
(2011; see also Milewicz and Elsig 2014) originally comprise 76 international agreements, and I 
was able to collect signature data for 53 of them. A list of treaties in my data is given in the 
Supplementary Materials.11 
                                                        
10
  See https://treaties.un.org/.  
11
 Unfortunately, I lack reliable data on treaties’ degree of legalization, which would allow me to analyze more 
effectively what kind of costs or benefits are associated with each agreement for the countries in my sample. Since 
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Many studies on ratification use the treaty-country year as the unit of analysis and model 
whether a treaty-country dyad “fails” in a given year, i.e., a treaty has been ratified (e.g., 
Bernauer et al. 2010, 2013; Elsig et al. 2011; Milewicz and Elsig 2014). This approach seems not 
necessarily appropriate in my context due to two reasons. First, the treaty-country year seems 
only suitable when potential temporal lags can be easily identified, i.e., if there is an immediate 
or a one-year lagged impact of an explanatory variable on ratification. It seems plausible that 
such an effect is given for, e.g., economic factors or regime type. That said, it is likely that the lag 
structure of an effect is more complex when focusing on leadership turnovers. For example, may 
a leadership turnover in t only have an effect on ratification in t+1? Or may it also affect 
ratifications in the second, third, or fourth year after a new leader assumed office? Eventually, a 
higher degree of aggregation seems warranted for addressing potential concerns in this regard and 
in terms of endogeneity more generally. Second, using the treaty-country year as the unit of 
analysis induces an artificial increase of (or multiplication in) the number of observations. A 
large number of observations decreases the standard errors, making it more difficult not to find 
statistically significant results. However, such statistical significance may be entirely driven by 
the artificially large number of observations, and not by actually existing statistically significant 
relations between variables (see Cranmer et al. 2012). As Erikson et al. (2009) show, minor 
effects could achieve unrealistically low p-values under those circumstances. This discussion 
leads to the concern that multiplying treaty-country pairs by years could lead to “erroneous 
conclusions” and “bias statistical analysis by inflating the number of events we are trying to 
model” (Cranmer et al. 2012: 285).  
To this end, I use the treaty-country as a unit of analysis, i.e., I aggregate a treaty-country pair 
over the years until ratification or the end of the observation period in my data (in case 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
all treaties constitute a “departure from previous practice,” nevertheless, it is obvious that they are initially indeed 
costly (at least to some degree). 
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ratification did not occur) and, therefore, create a “spell” for every pair of an international 
agreement and a state that can potentially ratify it. This approach not only addresses endogeneity 
concerns, such as simultaneity between treaty ratification and leader change (see also Quiroz 
Flores 2012), but also addresses problems associated with unclear temporal lag structures and it 
avoids artificially increasing the number of observations (see also Bernauer et al. 2010, 2013; 
Elsig et al. 2011). Considering this structure, most time-varying explanatory variables (described 
below) are set at starting values (i.e., values at the beginning of a treaty-country pair). Note, 
however, that my results are virtually unchanged when moving to a duration estimation 
framework (that then takes right-censoring into account) or using the treaty-country-year as the 
unit of analysis. Both analyses are summarized in the Supplementary Materials. 
After aggregating the data from Elsig et al. (2011; see also Milewicz and Elsig 2014) to the 
treaty-country level, I obtain 2,670 spells. The combinations of a treaty with any country in the 
world that signed before a leadership turnover (if any) (treaty-country spell) enter the data set as 
soon as the focal treaty is open for ratification between 1990 and 2004; for each treaty-county 
pair, the year of ratification is coded or, if a state has not joined a treaty by the end of 2008, it is 
coded that ratification has not occurred. Based on this information, I created a binary ratification 
variable that receives the value of 1 if the agreement in a treaty-country spell has been ratified by 
the end of 2008 or the value of 0 if no ratification occurred. Following Elsig et al. (2011; see also 
Milewicz and Elsig 2014), I treat different legal expressions of formally joining a treaty, e.g., 
accession or approval, as equivalent to ratification. Out of the 2,670 treaty-country spells in my 
data, about 81 percent of them saw ratification until 2008. This further underlines my claim that 
signature, in fact, is a very strong signal for a country’s willingness to eventually join an 
agreement. That said, note that sufficient variation does exist for the outcome item. 
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Because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use logistic regression models. 
I cluster the standard errors at the country level to control for potential intra-group correlations. 
Similarly, as a country’s earlier ratification of one agreement might affect the same state’s current 
chances to join another one, I control for temporal autocorrelation with cubic polynomials on the 
time elapsed (in years) since the last ratification of another treaty (Carter and Signorino 2010). 
Finally, coefficients in logistic regression models do not allow for a direct interpretation and I 
thus present predicted probabilities of ratification for the values of my core explanatory variable: 
leadership turnover. 
 
Core Explanatory Variable: Leadership Turnover – SOLS Change 
My main independent variable pertains to political leadership change and, more specifically, 
turnovers that are accompanied by a change in the domestic support base. As a result, I only 
focus on those leader turnovers that are associated with a change in the “source of leader support” 
(SOLS) (Mattes et al. 2015, 2016). I use the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) 
data compiled by Mattes et al. (2016). The CHISOLS data set codes SOLS changes based on the 
domestic support base of a leader, while the leadership transitions as such in the data are taken 
from the Archigos data (Goemans et al. 2009).  
In democracies, SOLS changes usually “occur when the political party of the chief executive 
changes” (Mattes et al. 2016: 3); in non-democracies, SOLS changes are coded along the 
institutional setups of an autocratic regime and, to this end, only “transitions from one autocratic 
type to another” are coded as SOLS changes (Mattes et al. 2016: 4). For example, single-party 
regimes see a SOLS change when the party in power changes, monarchies experience such a 
leadership transition when the ruling dynasty ends, and military regimes or personalist dictators 
are not coded as SOLS changes when a single continuous military regime or dictator is in place. 
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Predesignated successors, especially something that occurs in personalist dictatorships, are not 
coded as changes, but only “cases in which a new leader with his own clique comes to power” 
(Mattes et al. 2016: 4).  
The detailed coding rules are available in Mattes et al. (2016). Based on the CHISOLS data 
set, I created a binary variable (SOLS Change) that receives a value of 1 if (1) exactly only one 
SOLS change has taken place and (2) that leadership turnover occurred after signature and before 
any ratification act. Hence, I omit treaty-country pairs with more than one SOLS change over the 
duration of a spell and I ignore years in which ratification (or signature) and SOLS change 
simultaneously occurred due to endogeneity concerns. In addition, using this coding procedure 
with the treaty-country unit of analysis ensures that every single treaty in my sample has been 
concluded and opened for ratification before the new leader assumes power. Hence, it is unlikely 
that incoming leaders have influenced the design and commitments of an international agreement 
– they have to make the ratification decision, though. Ultimately, I have information for all 2,670 
treaty-country pairs in my sample and about 13 percent of them have indeed seen exactly one 
SOLS change before ratification occurred (or the end of the sample period, i.e., 2008). 
 
Control Variables 
I control for several items that capture alternative explanations for why states may ratify 
international treaties and/or variables that could affect the chances of leader turnover in a country. 
For these additional variables, I follow the previous literature, which highlights that there are 
primarily three clusters of determinants that may influence countries’ chances of ratifying 
international treaties (see also Schneider and Urpelainen 2013; Wangler et al. 2013; Yamagata et 
al. 2013). First, there are international-level variables such as trade openness (e.g., Bernauer et 
al. 2010, 2013; Elsig et al. 2011; Milewicz and Elsig 2014; Bernauer et al. 2010; Spilker 2013; 
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Yamagata et al. 2013). Second, there are domestic-level characteristics such as political regime 
type (e.g., Mansfield et al. 2002; Neumayer 2002a,b; see also Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; von 
Stein 2008; Bernauer et al. 2010; Elsig et al. 2011; Milewicz and Elsig 2014). Finally, there are 
spatial dependencies, i.e., a state’s commitment to international agreements may be affected by 
other nations’ actions in this regard (e.g., Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Neumayer 2002a,b; 
Roberts et al. 2004; Fredriksson et al. 2007; von Stein 2008; Bernauer et al. 2010, 2013).  
Against this background, first, I include data on a country’s membership in IOs (IGO 
Membership), using the total number of intergovernmental organization of which a country is a 
member of (Pevehouse et al. 2004). Since my unit of analysis aggregates time over a treaty-
country spell, the variable captures the membership count of a state in the first year of the 
corresponding treaty-country pair. Second, to measure a country’s level of democracy, I use the 
combined polity2 variable from the Polity IV project that ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 
(full democracy) (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). The sample is not biased against non-democracies, 
since about 40 percent of the treaty-country pairs receive a value of +5 or lower on the polity 
scale. As in the case of IGO Membership, the variable Democracy captures a state’s polity score 
in the first year of its corresponding treaty-country pair entering the data. 
Third, I calculated a variable counting the total number of states in the international system 
that ratified the treaty in question by the end of a treaty-country spell (Number of Countries 
Ratified). This approach essentially follows the logic of a spatial lag, although countries’ links are 
not weighted by some sort of proximity measure (Franzese and Hays 2007). In addition, Elsig et 
al. (2011) and Milewicz and Elsig (2014) consider State Power, i.e., an item on a country’s 
national material capabilities comprising information on (1) military expenditure, (2) military 
personnel, and (3) energy consumption. According to Elsig et al. (2011) and Milewicz and Elsig 
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(2014), treaty ratifications should increase with capabilities. The variable is measured in the first 
year a state of a treaty-country pair is included in the sample. 
 Fifth, there is a country’s trade openness, measured as the ratio of a state’s sum of exports and 
imports to GDP (Trade Openness) in the first year of a treaty-country spell. This variable is based 
on the Penn World Tables (version 6.3). Moreover, leaders are more accountable, the more their 
fate depends on the selectorate, i.e., the set of people who have the ability to choose a country’s 
leader, and the winning coalition, i.e., the portion of the selectorate that keeps a leader in power 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). While some regime types may be generally more accountable 
than others, accountability matters particularly for leaders when citizens express their will on 
their performance via national elections (see Smith and Hayes 1997). This also applies at least to 
some extent to (partly) non-competitive elections that are frequently held in autocratic regimes 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). In line with this reasoning, several studies show that leaders time 
their political decisions according to the electoral agenda (e.g., Nordhaus 1975; Brender and 
Drazen 2005; Shi and Svensson 2006). The ratification of international treaties may not be an 
exception here. The data on election dates are taken from Goemans’s extension of the Archigos 
data (Goemans et al. 2009). I use a dummy variable indicating if a country-treaty pair has seen 
any election (1) or not (0). This operationalization captures the context of national elections, i.e., 
following Cazals and Sauquet (2016), I consider that leaders may take into account the domestic 
audience before elections as well (see also Chiozza and Choi 2003: 263; Smith and Hayes 1997). 
I combine information on presidential and parliamentary elections, i.e., national elections in 
general, as both types of elections are equally likely to matter for an executive leader’s concerns 
over accountability and voters’ potential punishment. 
Countries with constitutions that ask for explicit legislative approval may be less likely to 
ratify international agreements, as the required consent of legislators constitutes another veto 
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obstacle in the process of ratification. Eventually, additional, potentially divergent preferences 
lead to a policy stasis and a lower likelihood of ratification (see also Spilker and Koubi 2016). 
Legislative bodies thus play a major role for the ratification of an international agreement: for 
example, “both congressional chambers must agree to the required changes in US domestic law” 
(Bang et al. 2012: 756). Employing the data from Hathaway (2007), I constructed a variable on 
whether legislative approval is needed in any house of a state’s legislature. The data are based on 
the constitutions of all countries in 2007. As constitutional provisions rarely change, if at all, I 
treat this item as time-invariant. The models below demonstrate as well, though, that my core 
result holds even when omitting this variable (and all others). About 78 percent of 2,611 treaty-
country spells are characterized by the need for legislative approval of the executive’s ratification 
decision. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. VIF 
Ratification 2,670 0.807 0.394 0 1  
SOLS Change 2,670 0.132 0.339 0 1 1.14 
Election 2,670 0.657 0.475 0 1 1.18 
Number Countries Ratified 2,670 74.616 45.490 0 185 1.26 
Democracy 2,298 3.982 6.490 -10 10 1.33 
Security and Crime Treaty 2,670 0.378 0.485 0 1 2.16 
Environmental Treaty 2,670 0.321 0.467 0 1 2.17 
Trade Treaty 2,670 0.145 0.352 0 1 1.73 
Human Rights Treaty 2,670 0.157 0.364 0 1 Baseline 
State Power 2,642 0.004 0.049 -0.012 0.473 1.09 
Trade Openness 2,522 81.425 48.390 2.008 456.562 1.14 
IGO Membership 2,651 65.443 23.107 6 129 1.35 
Legislative Approval 2,611 0.780 0.414 0 1 1.04 
 
Note: Variables for temporal correction are omitted from the table. The Variance Inflation Factors have been 
calculated while leaving out the baseline category for the treaty issue areas. 
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Finally, I use the treaties’ underlying issue areas (human rights, environment, security, and 
trade) as control variables, which then capture the rationale that the salience and costs of treaties 
are likely to vary over issue area and, consequently, affect the cost-benefit analysis of 
governments. The data for these four controls, i.e., Human Rights Treaty, Security and Crime 
Treaty, Environmental Treaty, and Trade Treaty, are taken from Elsig et al. (2011) and Milewicz 
and Elsig (2014), and I use Human Rights Treaty as the reference agreement type (i.e., this 
variable is left out of the models as the baseline). Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive 
statistics of all variables I discussed so far. 
 
Empirical Findings 
Table 2 summarizes the main models of my empirical analysis. The first model focuses on SOLS 
Change as the only explanatory variable next to the temporal controls. Clarke (2005, 2009), for 
example, argues that control variables may increase the bias in model estimates, and not decrease 
it, under specific circumstances. Model 2 then drops the main independent variable and 
incorporates the control covariates only. Finally, Model 3 constitutes my core model as both the 
main explanatory item and the controls are jointly considered. For assessing the models’ fit, I 
report logarithmic (pseudo) likelihoods, χ2 test statistics, and the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), which is multiplied by the number of observations in each model. In general, the smaller 
the AIC, the better the model fit. As indicated above, I also report predicted probabilities of treaty 
ratification in Figure 2 for the different values of SOLS Change. And, finally, I analyze the 
predictive validity of the results by reporting the expected percent of correctly predicted cases as 
well as the predicted proportional reduction in error (Herron 2000) in Table 2. To assess the 
robustness of my results, I examine various alternative model specifications, which and their 
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corresponding results are summarized in the Supplementary Materials. These robustness checks 
further support the findings discussed in the following. 
First, Table 2 provides strong support for my theory. Regardless of the model specification, 
SOLS Change exerts a negative and highly significant impact on the likelihood of treaty 
ratification. My main explanatory variable also contributes to the model fit as demonstrated by 
the shift in the AIC across Models 2 and 3. In more substantive terms, Figure 2 shows the 
predicted probabilities of treaty ratification under two different scenarios: first, when SOLS 
Change receives the value of 1, i.e., there was exactly one replacement of a government leader by 
a new one who relies on different social groups for support before ratification occurred; and, 
secondly, when SOLS Change=0, i.e., when there was no leadership turnover before a treaty-
country spell has seen ratification (if any). I calculated these substantive quantities of interest 
while holding all other variables constant at their median values along the lines of King et al. 
(2000). As the probabilities are simulated parameters, I present density plots that capture their 
distribution, and the horizontal bars at the bottom of Figure 2 signify the point estimates of the 
two scenarios’ probabilities and their 90 percent confidence intervals. 
When there was exactly one replacement of a government leader by a new one who relies on 
different social groups for support before ratification, the predicted probability of treaty 
ratification after that leadership turnover in a treaty-country spell is around 56 percent. 
Conversely, this probability increases by about 30 percentage points to 86 percent when there 
was no leadership turnover associated with a different support base, i.e., when changing SOLS 
Change to 0. Note that the horizontal bars for the probability point estimates’ confidence 
intervals do not overlap, which means that the difference between the two scenarios’ predicted 
probabilities is statistically significant.  
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Table 2. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Logistic Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SOLS Change -1.244  -1.588 
 (0.222)***  (0.278)*** 
Election  -1.013 -0.701 
  (0.179)*** (0.190)*** 
Number of Countries Ratified  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Democracy   0.069  0.097 
  (0.013)*** (0.016)*** 
Security and Crime Treaty  -0.122 -0.116 
  (0.157) (0.159) 
Environmental Treaty   1.416  1.442 
  (0.217)*** (0.228)*** 
Trade Treaty  -0.767 -0.571 
  (0.182)*** (0.190)*** 
State Power  -3.361 -3.252 
  (1.319)** (1.603)** 
Trade Openness  -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002)** 
IGO Membership  -0.014 -0.017 
  (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Legislative Approval   0.371  0.334 
  (0.183)** (0.194)* 
Time Since Last Ratification  1.531  1.701  1.523 
  (0.411)*** (0.487)*** (0.504)*** 
Time Since Last Ratification2 -0.665 -0.706 -0.597 
 (0.310)** (0.387)* (0.399) 
Time Since Last Ratification3  0.045  0.041  0.025 
 (0.048) (0.060) (0.063) 
Constant  1.444  2.670  2.794 
 (0.101)** (0.468)*** (0.524)*** 
Observations 2,670 2,221 2,221 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,220.77 -895.60 -844.15 
Wald χ2 71.18*** 182.51*** 184.80*** 
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted 0.71 0.74 0.76 
Expected Proportional Reduction in Error 0.07 0.14 0.20 
AIC (*N) 2,451.55 1,819.20 1,718.29 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
 
Eventually, I conclude that my empirics strongly and robustly suggest that cases with 
leadership turnover are associated with a significantly lower likelihood of ratification than 
agreement-state dyads in which the executive has not been replaced – given the predecessor’s 
support for an agreement and the change in the domestic support base. New leaders with a 
different support base represent different constituents than their predecessors and, thus, dissimilar 
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beliefs and ideas about foreign-policy decision making. In addition, their different support base 
allows them to escape potential “entrapment” that bound the old executive. Ultimately, given a 
clear signal of the preceding leader to support ratification of a treaty, ratification should be less 
likely with a new executive that is based on a different support base.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Treaty Ratification According to SOLS Change 
 
Note: First difference estimate, i.e., the predicted probability of ratification when moving SOLS Change from its 
minimum (0) to its maximum (1) while holding all other variables at their median values, is at -0.302 (90 percent 
confidence interval: [-0.402; -0.204]). Mean point estimate of probability of ratification for SOLS Change=0 is at 
0.858 (90 percent confidence interval: [0.816; 0.895]). Mean point estimate of probability of ratification for SOLS 
Change =1 is at 0.557 (90 percent confidence interval: [0.467; 0.650]). Estimates are based on simulations (N=1,000 
of simulated parameters), while holding all other variables at their median values. Horizontal bars in the figure 
pertain to 90 percent confidence intervals of probabilities’ point estimates. 
 
With regard to the control variables, most of them mirror previous findings in the literature. 
For example, as expected, Democracy has a positive impact on the likelihood of ratification: 
more democratic states are generally more likely to commit to international problem-solving 
efforts. On average, the likelihood of ratification differs by 34 percentage points when comparing 
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a fully autocratic with a fully democratic state in the first year of a treaty-country spell. On the 
other hand, the findings for State Power reveal a significantly negative effect across my models. 
On average, the risk of ratification drops substantially (about 31 percentage points) if State Power 
is raised from its minimum to its maximum. There are also interesting results with regard to the 
treaty dummies, the election variable, and my measure for legislative approval. First, 
environmental treaties are significantly more likely than human-rights agreements to be ratified. 
This seems to be the case as most environmental treaties are less costly. Conversely, trade treaties 
are significantly less likely than human-rights agreements to be ratified. This is likely to be 
driven by the more complex cost-benefit structure of a trade agreement than in the case of 
human-rights treaties.  
Legislative Approval is a variable that is associated with an effect that may not have been 
expected.12 That is, if legislative approval is actually required, the likelihood of ratification 
increases. Clearly, endogeneity might bias this finding in that, for example, leaders only ratify a 
treaty if they can be sure about parliamentary approval. In addition, recall that I only examine a 
sample of cases for which we could observe a clear signal of support (signature). As 
demonstrated in Model 1, however, when leaving out this variable, my core result remains 
unchanged. Future research might want to examine this effect more thoroughly than I could 
possibly do here.  
Election is, as expected, negatively signed and highly significant. In the context of elections, 
leaders might be more careful not to lose domestic support by pursuing (foreign) policies that are 
less risky. Not ratifying an international agreement does not seem to be an exception here: on 
average, the likelihood of ratification is 6 percentage points lower in times of an election than in 
non-election treaty-country spells. Finally, the temporal controls show that the likelihood of 
                                                        
12
  Note that the results are virtually identical when replacing the Legislative Approval variable by Henisz’s (2000) 
POLCONIII measure on political constraints and veto players. 
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treaty ratification first increases, then decreases, and then increases again after another, previous 
treaty has been ratified. 
 
Table 3. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Robustness Check 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SOLS Change -2.038  -2.628 
 (0.230)***  (0.311)*** 
Election  -0.022  0.648 
  (0.203) (0.232)*** 
Number of Countries Ratified   0.004  0.009 
  (0.002) (0.002)*** 
Democracy   0.009  0.038 
  (0.015) (0.017)** 
Security and Crime Treaty  -0.409 -0.512 
  (0.177)** (0.172)*** 
Environmental Treaty   1.244  1.187 
  (0.220)*** (0.228)*** 
Trade Treaty  -1.075 -0.418 
  (0.244)*** (0.280) 
State Power  -3.683 -3.838 
  (0.873)*** (1.248)** 
Trade Openness  -0.004 -0.007 
  (0.002)** (0.002)*** 
IGO Membership  -0.009 -0.011 
  (0.005)* (0.005)** 
Legislative Approval   0.384  0.306 
  (0.223)* (0.211) 
Time Since Signature -0.496 -0.442 -0.591 
 (0.033)*** (0.045)*** (0.054)*** 
Time Since Last Ratification  0.922  1.415  1.411 
  (0.0.423)** (0.475)*** (0.520)*** 
Time Since Last Ratification2 -0.582 -0.679 -0.749 
 (0.325)* (0.383)* (0.401)* 
Time Since Last Ratification3  0.049  0.048  0.058 
 (0.046) (0.055) (0.056) 
Constant  3.741  3.410  3.992 
 (0.184)*** (0.567)*** (0.681)*** 
Observations 2,447 2,036 2,036 
Log pseudolikelihood -881.26 -712.27 -621.00 
Wald χ2 276.41*** 240.86*** 225.55*** 
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted 0.78 0.78 0.81 
Expected Proportional Reduction in Error 0.32 0.30 0.40 
AIC (*N) 1,774.51 1,454.55 1,274.00 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
  
As indicated above, the Supplementary Materials summarize a series of robustness checks. An 
additional analysis that seems worth presenting already here pertains to the time elapsed between 
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signature and SOLS change. It has been suggested that leadership turnover could merely be an 
artifact of treaties that are very difficult to ratify and, as such, take longer to achieve ratification. 
One way to address this concern is to include a control measuring the amount of time elapsed 
between signature and leader turnover (if any). Table 3 presents the corresponding results and, as 
demonstrated there, the core finding remains robust. All other robustness checks and additional 
analyses can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
 
Conclusion 
Leaders are ultimately responsible for their country’s foreign policy and the ratification of 
international treaties is clearly part of this. But what role do leaders really play within this 
context? This article sought to contribute to clarifying this. By focusing on leadership change 
and, more specifically, the replacement of a government leader by a new one who relies on 
different social groups for support, I developed a theoretical framework that systematically 
examines the relationship of leadership turnover and the likelihood of ratifying international 
agreements in light of a predecessor’s clearly signaled support for an international agreement. 
Empirically, I analyzed recently compiled data on multilateral treaties that have been concluded 
in the post-Cold War era.  
First, changes in the political leadership of a country matter for ratification decisions. My 
theory took into account support for a treaty issued by an executive before the replacement of the 
leader and showed that we would expect that an incoming leader might be more hesitant to ratify 
that agreement. In turn, the likelihood of ratification goes down. The hypothesis receives robust 
empirical support, and my work correspondingly highlights the importance of domestic-level, 
“first-image” variables (Chiozza and Choi 2003: 275), and the strong connection between 
domestic and international politics, which further mirrors the notion by Goemans et al. (2009) 
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that the scholarly work is well advised to move beyond still prevalent state-centric perspectives 
(see also Wolford 2007, 2012; Mattes et al. 2015). States are not unitary actors and the need is 
still given to further study their role in international relations and comparative politics in a more 
disaggregated way. In the words of Chiozza and Choi (2003: 275): “leaders’ type cannot remain 
an all-encompassing category if it is to be of any use in empirical research.” This claim stated 
more than ten years ago is no less relevant today, and it is my hope that several crucial policy 
implications and avenues for further research might emerge from my work.  
Second, the ratification decision is based on a cost-benefit analysis of leaders. My research 
sought to increase our understanding of leader-related factors within this analysis, thus allowing 
policymakers now to take these factors specifically into account when negotiating treaties. As 
new leaders seem particularly associated with a significantly lower likelihood of ratification, 
additional benefits and incentives should perhaps be introduced into a treaty framework to 
increase state participation. When encountering leaders in negotiations over international 
agreements who might signal that they are reluctant to ratify, this research could shed light on the 
reasons for why this is the case.  
Third, from a scholarly perspective, my framework applies to democracies and non-
democracies alike. That being said, the level of accountability is clearly lower in autocratic states 
than in democracies (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). And while there is some evidence for an 
interaction with the democracy item as demonstrated in the Supplementary Materials, future 
research might focus more strongly on autocratic leaders, the associated factors within non-
democratic states, as well as the differences across autocracies and democracies that may then 
shape the impact of leader turnover in diverse ways. In addition, although I have identified a 
general pattern in the relationship between leadership turnover and treaty ratification, there are 
plenty of cases that deviate from this pattern. Consider the Convention on Protection of Children 
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and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption and the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime. Germany signed the former in 1997 and there was a 
SOLS change in 1998 (a coalition led by the Social Democrats assuming power); but the new 
government still ratified the agreement in 2001. In terms of the second treaty, the US signed it 
under Bill Clinton in 2000, but it was the Bush administration that ratified it in 2005. As a result, 
it seems an effort worth making to examine ratifications, which occur despite a leadership 
turnover and despite a signature from a predecessor government, in future research, as these are 
precisely the cases that deviate from the general pattern I have uncovered. In that sense, it is also 
my hope that my project, as the first one on that subject, will lead to several other studies in this 
promising field of research. 
Finally, more disaggregated analyses might be necessary, also with regard to democracies. It is 
indeed plausible that particular forms of democratic government (presidential vs. parliamentary 
systems; see Bang et al. 2012) reinforce the effects I argue for. There are also many examples of 
“cohabitation” or divided government, where different parties dominate the executive and the 
legislative. Future research should address this and related issues within the nexus of treaty 
ratification and political leadership. 
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International Treaty Ratification and Leader Turnover – 
Supplementary Materials 
The Supplementary provide additional information, analyses, and robustness checks that further 
support my argument and findings of the main article. These include: 
 
• Examining only country-treaty spells of short durations.  
• Instead of robust standard errors clustered by country, I have re-estimated the core model 
using bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications. 
• Due to the similarity of binary time-series cross-section data and discrete duration data, I 
also employed Cox proportional hazards models. 
• I present Cox proportional hazards and logistic regression models that have the 
treaty-country year as the unit of analysis. 
• I examined a potential interaction between the democracy variable and SOLS Change. 
• A last robustness check incorporates country-fixed effects to capture any unobserved 
time-invariant unit-level effects. 
• I present the main models’ separation plots. 
• I provide an overview of which international treaties are included in the data set. 
 
Treaty-Country Spells of Short Durations 
As discussed in the main text, I decided to rely on the treaty-country pair as the unit of analysis. 
To this end, I used the starting values for some of the covariates (e.g., the democracy item), while 
other variables are based on their values at the end of each spell. Most importantly, my main 
explanatory item, SOLS Change, captures only one, if any, leadership turnover and we also know 
that such a change, if any, occurred after signature and before a ratification (if any). My main 
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argument in the main article is that such a data structure does not artificially inflate the number of 
observations and it effectively addresses concerns regarding endogeneity. However, a reasonable 
objection to this research design could be that the duration of the treaty-country spells might then 
be too long, which would induce that the actual effects of some covariates are severely 
temporally lagged. 
 
Table A1. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Logistic Regression 
 
 Model A1 
SOLS Change -2.284 
 (0.509)*** 
Election  0.509 
 (0.344) 
Number of Countries Ratified  0.033 
 (0.003)*** 
Democracy  0.070 
 (0.024)*** 
Security and Crime Treaty -18.41 
 (0.292)*** 
State Power -5.384 
 (1.339)*** 
Trade Openness -0.012 
 (0.002)*** 
IGO Membership -0.019 
 (0.007)*** 
Legislative Approval -0.204 
 (0.323) 
Constant 20.772 
 (0.764)*** 
Observations 957 
Log pseudolikelihood -215.62 
Wald χ2 170.06*** 
AIC (*N) 455.23 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Environmental Treaty and Trade Treaty dropped as 
they predict ratification perfectly. Variables for temporal correction included, but omitted from presentation. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
 
Treat-country spells in my data set range from 0.5 to 18 years, with an average duration of 
4.34 years. To illustrate the problem more clearly, consider the spells that have a duration of 18 
years (0.34 percent of the cases in my sample): the effect of the covariates based on initial values 
is supposed to be present over the entire duration of 18 years, while the only leadership turnover 
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that may have occurred in, say, the third year of that spell is meant to have an almost equally long 
impact on the likelihood of treaty ratification. Moreover, consider a treaty that becomes open for 
ratification in 1992 and nations a and b. Suppose that a signed in 1992 and ratified in 1998, but b 
never ratified after having signed in, say, 1992 as well. For SOLS Change, it would be coded as 1 
if leader change occurred between 1993 and 1997 in the case of nation a, and coded as 1 if leader 
change changed occurred between 1993 and 2008 in nation b. However, there may be a greater 
possibility of leader change in b and, therefore, leader change and ratification delay are 
correlated. In order to deal with this issue, I dropped a series of cases from the data as I only kept 
those treaty-country spells in my sample that have shorter than average durations (i.e., less than 
4.34 years). This ensures that the effects of my core variable and the other covariates are not 
based on seemingly long temporal lags, which could induce spurious relationships.  
Table A1 summarizes my findings. The sample size obviously decreases by quite a bit to 957 
spells as more than 50 percent of the cases leave the estimation sample. That being said, the 
results presented in Table A1 are virtually identical to those discussed in the main text: SOLS 
Change exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of treaty 
ratification.  
 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
All models are based on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), which has desirable asymptotic 
properties such as consistency, efficiency, or normality (King and Zeng 2001). However, these 
properties might not be given and MLE estimates can be biased particularly when there are only a 
few cases to analyze. While this may not necessarily be an issue in my setup, I aggregate treaty-
country years into spells and, in fact, there is no specific rule, which determines when a sample is 
“small”' or “large.” To this end, I considered bootstrapping the standard errors. 
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Table A2. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Logistic Regression 
 
 Model A2 
SOLS Change -1.588 
 (0.161)*** 
Election -0.701 
 (0.166)*** 
Number of Countries Ratified  0.001 
 (0.002) 
Democracy  0.097 
 (0.012)*** 
Security and Crime Treaty -0.116 
 (0.170) 
Environmental Treaty  1.442 
 (0.223)*** 
Trade Treaty -0.571 
 (0.180)*** 
State Power -3.252 
 (1.095)*** 
Trade Openness -0.004 
 (0.001)*** 
IGO Membership -0.017 
 (0.004)*** 
Legislative Approval  0.334 
 (0.163)** 
Constant  2.794 
 (0.405)*** 
Observations 2,221 
Log pseudolikelihood -844.15 
Wald χ2 298.07*** 
AIC (*N) 1,718.29 
 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1,000 replications). Variables for temporal correction included, 
but omitted from presentation. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
 
According to Guan (2003: 71), “[b]ootstrapping is a nonparametric approach for evaluating 
the distribution of a statistic based on random re-sampling.” The procedure is based on random 
sample draws (with replacement) repeatedly from the sample data. I specify 1,000 as the number 
of random draws and calculated the parameters for my main model again. The results are 
summarized in Table A2: clearly, the coefficient estimates are identical to those presented in the 
main text’s core model, only the standard errors change. However, the standard error pertaining 
to SOLS Change actually decreases in size, which implies that the overall conclusion based on 
this variable does not change. 
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Cox Duration Model 
Time-series cross-section data using a binary dependent variable, which I rely on for the main 
analyses, are similar to discrete duration data (Beck et al. 1998). Duration models, i.e., estimators 
modeling the time elapsed until an even occurs as a function of covariates, might be an 
alternative estimation procedure then. To this end, I re-define the dependent variable as the time 
(in years) between the date when an international treaty becomes open for ratification and the 
date a country ratifies that agreement (or the end of the observation period in case ratification did 
not occur). In other words, I use the duration of a treaty-country spell as the outcome variable in 
the following alternative model setup.  
Concentrating on duration is based on the assumption that the differences in time that 
countries need to ratify an agreement reflect their – and leaders’ – relative preference intensities. 
More rapid ratification signals a stronger commitment to international cooperation (see also 
Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Elsig et al. 2011; Bernauer et al. 2013; Milewicz and Elsig 2014). 
This approach has also econometric advantages as it may give more variation across countries 
than simply estimating the likelihood of whether a country ratified or not (Schneider and 
Urpelainen 2013) and I can consider the different time lags that are characteristic for states’ 
decisions in this regard (Elsig et al. 2011: 540). 
Since I do not impose a particular functional form on the baseline hazard of ratifying an 
agreement, I use Cox proportional hazards models. This leaves the duration dependency 
unspecified and focuses the empirical analysis on how the covariates shift the baseline hazard. I 
examined the Schoenfeld residuals for a violation of the proportionality assumption, which 
showed that this assumption is indeed not met for some of my covariates across the models. 
Thus, I include interaction terms for all explanatory variables with the natural logarithm of time 
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(Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004: 131ff).  
 
Table A3. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Cox Duration Models 
 
 Model A3 
SOLS Change -0.994 
 (0.110)*** 
Election -1.036 
 (0.081)*** 
Number of Countries Ratified -0.009 
 (0.001)*** 
Democracy  0.054 
 (0.006)*** 
State Power -2.061 
 (1.640) 
Trade Openness -0.001 
 (0.001) 
IGO Membership -0.010 
 (0.002)*** 
Legislative Approval -0.036 
 (0.078) 
Observations 2,221 
Log pseudolikelihood -9,820.76 
Wald χ2 667.65*** 
AIC (*N) 19,657.52 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Efron method for ties. Table entries are non-
exponentiated coefficients. Treaty issue areas used as strata and, thus, not included as covariates. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
 
I fit stratified Cox models. This stratification approach allows that baseline hazard functions 
are estimated for each stratum separately. For example, Neumayer (2003, 2004) demonstrates 
that governmental parties’ support for international cooperation efforts might depend on their 
political ideology and the type of an agreement. The reason for this is that “pro-environmental 
policies complement distributional concerns and skepticism toward the beneficial effects of 
unregulated markets, which are traditionally regarded as separating the political left from the 
political right“ (Neumayer 2004: 167; see also Dunlap et al. 2001). Leaders, under some 
circumstances, might therefore be more likely to ratify environmental agreements, but not 
international trade or security treaties. Following Elsig et al. (2011; see also Milewicz and Elsig 
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2014), I use the treaties’ underlying issue areas (human rights, environment, security, and trade) 
as strata, which then control for the fact that the salience of treaties in my sample is likely to vary 
over issue area and, consequently, for the cost-benefit analysis of leaders. As in the main text, the 
data for these four strata, i.e., Human Rights Treaty, Security and Crime Treaty, Environmental 
Treaty, and Trade Treaty, are also taken from Elsig et al. (2011) and Milewicz and Elsig (2014). 
I report non-exponentiated coefficients, where higher values for an explanatory variable 
signify faster ratification, i.e., positive coefficients indicate an increasing hazard. I also cluster the 
standard errors on the country level for taking into account intra-group correlations.  
Table A3 emphasizes that changing the estimator does not have any impact on the results as 
such. We still obtain a negative impact of SOLS Change on the likelihood of ratification as 
demonstrated by this item’s negative non-exponentiated coefficient in Model A3: in other words, 
therefore, a SOLS change in fact delays ratification.  
 
Using the Treaty-Country-Year as the Unit of Analysis 
In order to show that the aggregation of treaty-country years into treaty-country spells, however 
plausible and reasonable it may seem for addressing the concerns discussed in the main text, does 
not affect the substance of my findings, Table A4 relies on the “disaggregated” treaty-country 
year as the unit of analysis. As a result, all covariates are based on the actual year values and not, 
as in the main text, on spell-start or spell-end year values. Table A4 presents two different 
specifications: one based on a Cox model (Model A4) and a second that is based on a logistic 
regression model (Model A5). However, Table A4 underlines that the unit of analysis does not 
affect my results either: while the number of observations increases to more than 8,000, SOLS 
Change remains negatively signed and highly statistically significant. 
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Table A4. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Cox Duration and Logistic Regression 
 
 Model A4 Model A5 
SOLS Change -0.914 -1.118 
 (0.086)*** (0.110)*** 
Election  0.041  0.020 
 (0.130) (0.080) 
Number of Countries Ratified  0.032  0.022 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Democracy  0.029  0.075 
 (0.010)*** (0.009)*** 
Security and Crime Treaty   0.147 
  (0.094) 
Environmental Treaty   0.166 
  (0.120) 
Trade Treaty   0.255 
  (0.159) 
State Power -1.034 -1.842 
 (1.804) (1.029)* 
Trade Openness -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
IGO Membership  0.006  0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Legislative Approval -0.143  0.117 
 (0.178) (0.115) 
Constant  -3.213 
  (0.298)*** 
Observations 8,263 8,263 
Log pseudolikelihood -8,318.19 -3,395.53 
Wald χ2 770.36*** 566.15*** 
AIC (*N) 16,666.39 6,821.05 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Variables for temporal correction included, but 
omitted from presentation. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
 
 
Interaction between the Democracy Variable and SOLS Change 
I additionally examine the possibility that the effect of leadership change might vary by regime 
type and, thus, interact SOLS Change with the democracy item. This seems crucial due to the 
importance of domestic institutions for the ratification decision and because the level of domestic 
support is also a function of the size of a country’s winning coalition, which is highly correlated 
with democracy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, 
Croco (2011: 463) argues that democratic institutions facilitate removing a political leader, while 
Mattes et al. (2015: 282f) contend that democracies are based on policymaking rules that 
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“discourage dramatic change in policy.” Including the multiplicative term of SOLS Change and 
Democracy captures the following conditional effect of leader change on the likelihood of treaty 
ratification (see also Mattes et al. 2015: 187). As we cannot directly interpret the size, signs, and 
standard errors of the components of a multiplicative specification (Brambor et al. 2006), I 
calculate the average marginal effects of SOLS Change according to Democracy to allow for a 
substantive interpretation. Table A5 and Figure A1 summarizes the corresponding results. 
 
Table A5. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Logistic Regression 
 
 Model A6 
SOLS Change -1.578 
 (0.352)*** 
Election -0.701 
 (0.190)*** 
Number of Countries Ratified  0.001 
 (0.002) 
Democracy  0.097 
 (0.017)*** 
SOLS Change * Democracy -0.001 
 (0.045) 
Security and Crime Treaty -0.116 
 (0.159) 
Environmental Treaty  1.441 
 (0.229)*** 
Trade Treaty -0.571 
 (0.190)*** 
State Power -3.249 
 (1.615)** 
Trade Openness -0.004 
 (0.002)** 
IGO Membership -0.017 
 (0.004)*** 
Legislative Approval  0.334 
 (0.193)* 
Constant  2.792 
 (0.522)*** 
Observations 2,221 
Log pseudolikelihood -844.145 
Wald χ2 187.47*** 
AIC (*N) 1,720.29 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Variables for temporal correction included, but 
omitted from presentation. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
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Figure A1. The Impact of Political Leadership Turnover Conditional on Regime Type 
 
Note: Panel shows average marginal effects (solid line) based on logistic regression model estimates (Table A5), 
while all other variables are held at their mean values. Dashed lines pertain to 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Histogram of Democracy shows the distribution of this item (right-hand side vertical axis). 
 
Figure A1 highlights that there is not much evidence for an impact of SOLS Change 
conditional on regime type. Having said that, future work could try to offer more nuanced 
explanations by concentrating on the variation within system types, e.g., presidential vs. 
parliamentary systems.  
 
Controlling for Unobserved Country Characteristics: Fixed Effects Estimation 
Country fixed effects address any unobserved, time-invariant country characteristics I may have 
omitted in the study’s main analyses. By including them, I also address any remaining 
endogeneity concerns. That is, I discussed and addressed several issues of endogeneity in this 
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research, but endogeneity between my core explanatory variable and ratification may persist. For 
example, the ratification of an international treaty can be both a contributor to and consequence 
of leadership turnover. I use fixed effects for countries to deal with this problem, which control 
for omitted variable bias and unobserved heterogeneity, as they address the unobserved variables 
that may lead to “self-selection” into, e.g., leadership transitions and SOLS changes. 
 
Table A6. Leadership Turnover and Treaty Ratification – Logistic Regression 
 
 Model A7 
SOLS Change -2.668 
 (0.409)*** 
Election -1.359 
 (0.259)*** 
Number of Countries Ratified  0.006 
 (0.002)** 
Democracy -0.019 
 (0.076) 
Security and Crime Treaty -0.185 
 (0.202) 
Environmental Treaty  1.348 
 (0.291)*** 
Trade Treaty -0.976 
 (0.279)*** 
State Power -4.696 
 (9.700) 
Trade Openness -0.035 
 (0.010)*** 
IGO Membership -0.177 
 (0.037)*** 
Legislative Approval -1.648 
 (4.380) 
Constant 23.143 
 (4.102)*** 
Observations 1,903 
Log pseudolikelihood -631.85 
Wald χ2 693.41*** 
AIC (*N) 1,287.69 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Country fixed effects and variables for temporal 
correction included, but omitted from presentation. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
 
Table A6 (Model A7) presents the findings for this last robustness check. First, some of the 
particularly largely time-invariant predictors (e.g., Democracy) are no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels in my model. The poor performance of the control variables can 
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be explained by the fact that fixed-effects models lack the ability to make inferences about time-
invariant or slow-moving variables, because fixed effects soak up most of the explanatory power 
of slowly changing variables and their coefficients are either not identified or difficult to estimate 
with precision (Beck 2001: 285; Plümper and Troeger 2007). However, SOLS Change remains 
negatively signed and substantively important. The replacement of a government leader by a new 
one who relies on different social groups for support thus continues to have a negative impact on 
the likelihood of ratifying an international treaty. 
 
Main Models’ Separation Plots 
In light of the two statistics I present in Table 2 of the main text to analyze the models’ predictive 
validity, I also created separation plots for Models 1-3. Separation plots allow the researcher “to 
evaluate model fit based upon the models’ ability to consistently match high-probability 
predictions to actual occurrences of the event of interest, and low-probability predictions to 
nonoccurrences of the event of interest” (Greenhill et al. 2011: 990). In more detail, these plots 
rearrange the data so that predicted values are sorted in ascending order (i.e., increase from left to 
right). In turn, actual instances of the outcome (in my case, ratification) and non-events are 
compared with these predicted values to assess whether and how they correspond. In the words of 
Greenhill et al. (2011: 994): “[t]he key idea is that the model’s fit (or predictive power) can now 
be evaluated by simply gauging the extent to which the actual instances of the event are 
concentrated at the bottom end of the table (right-hand side of the plot), and the nonevents at the 
top end of the table (left-hand side of the plot). A model with no predictive power – i.e., one 
whose outcomes can be approximated by a random coin toss – would generate an even 
distribution of 0s and 1s along the column on the right-hand side.” 
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In other words, for a model with reasonable predictive power, we would observe a 
“clustering” of most events (darker areas or bars) on the right-hand side of the plot. Figure A2 
summarizes my findings. As this graph demonstrates, the main text’s models fit the data 
reasonably well: most “events” are clustered on the right-hand side of the figure, although a few 
outliers (i.e., events on the left-hand side in each plot) do exist. This is likely to be driven by the 
underlying data-generating process: ratification usually is a rare event. 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Figure A2. Separation Plots 
 
Note: The graph depicts separation plots for the article’s main models (Model 1: top plot; Model 2: middle plot; 
Model 3: bottom plot). The line in each plot pertains to the predicted values (ascending order from 0 to 1). The 
marker (triangle) at each plot’s horizontal axis stands for the expected number of events: 1,780 (Model 1), 1,819 
(Model 2), and 1,819 (Model 3). 
 
International Agreements in Data Set 
Name of International Agreement 
Anti-Corruption Convention 
Arrest of Ships Convention 
Assignment of Receivables Convention 
Biodiversity Convention 
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol 
CCW Protocol II (Mines. Booby-Traps) 
Chemical Weapons Convention 
Children in Armed Conflict Protocol 
Climate Change Convention 
Compr. Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Electr. Communications Convention 
FAO Plant Genetic Resources 
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Financing of Terrorism Convention 
Hague PIL: Convention of International Protection of Adults 
Hague PIL: Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
Hague PIL: Convention on Parental Responsibility 
Hague PIL: Convention on Protection of Children & Adoption 
ICAO: Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection 
IMO Convention on Oil Pollution 
Int. Cocoa Agreement 
Int. Coffee Agreement 
Int. Sugar Agreement 
Int. Tropical Timber Agreement 
Kyoto Protocol 
Maritime Liens & Mortgages Convention 
Migrant Workers Convention 
Migrants Smuggling Protocol 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention 
Ottawa (Mine Ban) Convention 
Person Trafficking Protocol 
Prostitution of Children Protocol 
Revised Kyoto Convention 
Rome Statute Crime Convention 
Rotterdam Convention 
Stand-by Letters of Credit Convention 
Stockholm Convention (POP) 
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement (Law of the Sea) 
Terrorist Bombings Convention 
Trans Terminals Liability Convention 
Transnational Org Crime Convention 
UN Desertification Convention 
UN Firearms Protocol 
UN International Watercourse Convention 
UN Jurisdict. Immunities Conv 
UN Personnel Safety Convention 
UNIDROIT Convention and Protocol on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment 
UNIDROIT Convention Cultural Objects 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 
WIPO Patent Law Treaty 
WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty 
WIPO Trademark Law Treaty 
WTO GATT 
WTO Umbrella Agreement 
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